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STRENGTHENING CHINA'S REGULATORY
REGIME: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN
ENGAGE
Herbert ClaibornePell*
ABSTRACT

This article considers how the United States can constructively
contribute to the development of a more effective regulatory regime in
the People's Republic of China (PRC). It opens with a review of the
history and issues associated with China's regulatory regime. It then
surveys ongoing challenges and responses to these challenges. Finally,
it considers the national interests of the United States and China in
regulatory reform and proposes modest strategic initiatives for the
United States to pursue in light of these analyses of need and common
interest. The article's argument crosses the disciplinary boundaries of
law, political science, sociology, economics, and negotiation.
INTRODUCTION: A CONSENSUS?

Rarely a day passes without major U.S. papers reporting product
U.S.
defects in imports from the People's Republic of China.'
*The author received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center,
his A.B. from Harvard University and is admitted to practice in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island. He studied at Beijing University School of Law and has
worked with various governmental agencies and international law firms.
Opinions and assertions herein reflect the views of the author alone.
1 See, e.g., David Barboza, Reform Stalls in Chinese Factories: In
Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008,
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/
available
worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html?; David Barboza, China's Seafood Industry:
Dirty Water, Dangerous Fish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/asia/15fish.html; David Barboza,
Virus Spreading Alarm and Pig Disease in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/business/worldbusiness/
16pigs.html?scp=237&sq=china+safety&st-nyt; Walt Bogdanich, Chinese
Chemicals Flow Unchecked Onto World Drug Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,

available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/world/asia/
2007,
31chemical.html?scp=148&sq=china+safety&st-nyt; Keith Bradsher, China
Confirms Poison Was on Toy Beads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/1 I/world/asia/1 Ichina.html?scp= 13 1&sq=ch
ina+safety&st-nyt; China, Unregulated,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, available
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producers, consumers, and policymakers have achieved rare unity in
loudly advocating that China adhere to international product safety,
labor, and environmental standards.2
The People's Republic of China has promulgated an explosion of
new
regulations,
reorganized
administrative
agencies,
and
experimented with rule-making methods since the inception of its 1989
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/opinion/15wedl.html; Martin Fackler,
Insecticide-TaintedDumplings from China Sicken 175 in Japan, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/asia/
02japan.html; Gardiner Harris & Walt Bogdanich, Blood Thinner Linked to
China Had Contaminant, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/20O8/O3/O6/health/06heparin.html;Gardiner Harris &
Walt Bogdanich, F.D.A. Broke Its Rules by Not Inspecting Chinese Plant With
Problem Drug, N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
15,
2008,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/15/washington/15fda.html; Jane Hooker &
Walt Bogdanich, Tainted Drugs Tied to Maker of Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/31/world/asia/
31pharma.html; Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution
Reaches Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html?scp=220&sq=ch
ina+safety&st-myt; The Price of Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/opinion/22sat2.html;
Andrew
Adam
Newman, For Pet Owners, Too, Toys a Reason for Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22,

2007,

available

at

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/business/

22pettoys.htmil; Louise Story & David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys
Sent From China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/business/worldbusiness/1 5imports.html?s
cp=239&sq=china+safety&st-nyt. Rule 16.5, 18.2.2
2 See, e.g., Michael Falcone, Policy Points: Chinese Toy Redux, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage.html?res=
950CE2DD153BF932A1575 1CA9619C8B63&scp=82&sq=china+safety&st=nyt;
Barack Obama and Joe Biden 's Plan to Secure America and Restore Our Standing,
BarackObama.corn, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/foreignpolicy/index
campaign.php (declaring a goal "work to ensure that China plays by
international rules"); Eric Lipton & Louise Story, Toy Makers Seek Standards
for U.S. Safety, N.Y. TIMES , Sept. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/business/ 07toys.html?scp=208&sq=china
+safety&st=nyt; The Need for Regulation: For All of the Nation's Imports,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/
opinion/1 6sun 1.html?scp= 192&sq=china+safety&st=nyt;
Reform
and
Consumer Safety, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19mon4.htmlscp= 121 &sq=china
+safety&st-nyt; Steven R. Weisman, U.S. to Pressure China on Food and
Product Safety at Coming Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/business/07trade.html?scp= 108&sq=chin
a+safety&st=nyt.
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Administrative Litigation Law. 3 The U.S. and other nations have
worked with China on product deficiency issues in the past and
continue to do so by sending training delegations, practitioners, and
experts; by increasingly dispatching its own inspectors; and by raising
concerns in bilateral and multilateral meetings with the Chinese
government.4
These common efforts and concerns give the promising
appearance that China and the United States can work together to
establish a more effective regulatory regime in China. They might
even indicate that each party's interests are so closely aligned that both
sides could cooperate to achieve a major policy victory without making
significant tradeoffs. Indeed, effective regulation of Chinese imports to
the United States should protect U.S. consumers, producers, and
workers, in part because compliance with high standards will increase
the Chinese costs of production and make other countries (including the
United States) more competitive. But the Chinese would also win:
Chinese consumers would benefit from consumer and environmental
protections, Chinese workers would receive basic protections, Chinese
industry would further integrate international best practices, and the
Chinese government would continue its projects of increased
3 See discussion infra Section II, Brief Review of the Growth of
Administrative Law in China; see also David Barboza, China Says Its Seafood Is
Now Safer and Better,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/business/worldbusiness/18fish.html;
China
Agrees to Raise Its Product Standards, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2007, available at,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/world/asia/27china.html?scp=219&sq=china+s
afety&st=nyt; chinadaily.net, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2008npc/2008-03/1 I/content_6527183.htm.
4 Interview with David Vladeck (Feb. 11, 2008). See, e.g., Interview by

National Public Radio "All Things Considered" with Marcia Cross, Director for
Health Care, Government Accountability Office (April 22, 2008); John Feffer, China
What's the Big Mystery?, FOREIGN PoucY IN Focus, Dec. 4, 2006,

http://www.fpif.orgtfpiftxt/3752;

The

US-China

Legal

Cooperation

Fund,

http://www.uschinalegalcoop.org/; Kathryn McConnell, US. Food Safety Agencies,
Industry Seek More Import Regulation, America.gov, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://www.america-gov/st/washfile-engfish/2007/October/20071002152124AKllenno
CcMO.4573633.html; Andrezj Zwaniecki, U.S. Food Safety Agencies, Industry Seek
More
Import
Regulation,
Americagov,
July
10,
2007,
http://www.americagov/st/washfile-english2007/July/20070710163214saikceinawz
0.1669275.html; Elizabeth Denomy, China's EnvironmentalMovement, Council on
Foreign Relations, Feb. 7, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7770; An Lu, China
& Philippines Sign Minutes of Meeting on Import and Export Food Safety, CHINA
VIEw, Oct. 28, 2007, httpJ/news.xinhuaneLcom/english/2007-10/28/content

6963788.htm.
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effectiveness and legitimacy through rule of law and technocratic
decision-making.
Yet this rose-colored scenario is also unlikely; it is premised on
false assumptions and is perpetually fixated upon as a pretense for
avoiding tough decisions on either side of the Pacific. 5 Structural
challenges - political, constitutional, and social - obstruct China from
effectively regulating its products, environment, and labor standards.
Even if China agrees or attempts to make strides in these directions,
does it have the political will to follow through if the cost is its own
competitiveness or continuity of rule? Is it naive to think that the
United States will be driven by interests other than protectionism or
containment of China? What is required and realistic for China to
improve its regulatory system, and where can and ought the United
States lend a helping hand?
I. WHAT IS AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY REGIME? WHAT IS ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH RULE OF LAW GENERALLY? WHAT IS THE
RELATIONSHIP WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?

All societies struggle to balance the competing interests of their
constituents, a task that is central to government. The administrative or
regulatory regime is not essentially concerned with establishing what
the appropriate balance of interests should be. That is a question of
basic sovereignty and the responsibility of a society's most powerful
decision-makers, whether those decision-makers are the National
People's Congress (NPC) in China's unitary system, or the Congress,
President, and Supreme Court, who at different
times have the final say
6
in the U.S. system of separated powers.

5 Steven Wiesman, Politeness of China Talks Can 't Disguise the Discord,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/
world/asia/15china.html; Steven Wiesman, U.S.-China Trade Talks Conclude
With Modest Deals and Mutual Wariness, The N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 14, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/14/business/worldbusiness/
14trade.html; Steven Weisman, U.S. and Chinese Officials Duel on Economic
Issues, Dec. 13, 2007, N.Y. TIMES , availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
12/13/business/worldbusiness/l 3trades.html?scp=96&sq=china+safety&st-nyt.
6 The reality of both systems is naturally more complex. For example,
the NPC may issue a law to appease a group or international lobby without a
real desire or expectation that the law will be enforced. In a society where the
government speaks through more than law, how is a regulatory agency to be
effective? How are we to measure whether the agency is listening effectively?
In addition, the notion of comparing the goals and progress of administrative
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A regulatory regime is concerned with the implementation of
government dictates - making sure that envisioned balance of interests
is maintained as government actors write implementing regulations and
take enforcement action. An effective regulatory regime, then, turns
government policy into reality, ensuring that interests do not interfere
in the regulatory process to overcome the political process (however
imperfect that political process may have been).7 Regulatory authority
and processes have expanded dramatically as governments have
increasingly felt that expediency and more technocratic decisionmaking (leaving the government to articulate the broad balance of
interests) requires specialized agencies to respond to an increasingly
complex web of social, political, and economic relations.
Justice Frankfurter defined administrative law as "the field of
legal control exercised by law-administering agencies other than courts,8
and the field of control exercised by courts over such agencies."
Administrative law has historically been divided into three parts: (1)
the statutes endowing agencies with powers and establishing rules of
substantive law relating to those powers; (2) the body of agency-made
law, consisting of administrative rules, regulations, reports, opinions

law in China and the United States suffers from the very different starting
points of the two systems of government: Whereas the U.S. began with an
arguably more laissez faire approach, China's post-1949 model was command
and control production. Although there has been some convergence, the
structural challenges of each legacy are quite different.
7 As a result, an effective regulatory regime is closely interrelated with
the concept of rule of law - or, at least, rule by law. However vague the term
"rule of law" has become, its hallmark is the principle that governmental
authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly
disclosed laws adopted and enforced in accordance with due process. In
theory, there should be no deviation between rule of law and an effective
regulatory regime. But an appeal to fundamental rights or justice is also
claimed in the rule of law, at least in the West. The extent to which a
government deviates from theories of justice might mean the separation
between rule of law and effective regulatory control. However, the extent to
which the government has decreed (constitutionally or otherwise) that these
fundamental rights / interest groups be considered or preferred, then rule of law
and effective regulatory control should again converge. Although an effective
regulatory mechanism requires enforcing the government's dictate, the
complexity of modem states means that the government's dictate may be
confusing. This paper cannot seek to solve the conflicts of constitutional
interpretation. Rather, this paper proceeds with the simpler goal of ensuring
effective control when the NPC has released a clear law with clear purpose.
8 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv.
614, 615 (1927).
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containing findings of fact, and orders; and (3) the legal principles
governing the9 acts of public agents when those acts conflict with
private rights.
This paper focuses on the rule-making and enforcement
mechanisms of independent agencies as they relate to China's
regulatory regime.' 0
A difficult challenge in discussing the
effectiveness of this regime in China is the diversity of agencies, types
of possible regulation," and fundamental challenges to administrative
law itself.' 2 This paper opts to avoid these universal discussions in
9 Administrative law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10 This also tends to be the principal focus of academic study of

administrative law in the United States. Research on administrative law in the
People's Republic of China often focuses on its unique administrative detention
system, which this paper does not discuss. See, e.g., Sarah Biddulph, Review of
Police Powers of Administrative Detention in the People's Republic of China,
39 CREME & DELINQ 337 (1993).
I Even when there is agreement on the end goal, there may be much
disagreement about how to get there. Theories of effective regulation span
market-based approaches, independent certification bodies, civil liability
systems, permit and inspection programs, and fines for violations. Most
countries have a mix of these approaches depending on baseline market and
government ideologies, local concerns, and the different needs of the various
regulated industries: careful pre-certification for drug design, regular
inspections for drug production, simple tort liability or, perhaps, no liability at
all for certain government action.
12 These challenges include whether standardization of any kind is
possible, the ability to construct coherent regulations, and whether
administrative law is inherently anti-democratic. Legislatures typically turn to
independent agencies to carry out this regulation for three principal reasons: the
lack of time and resources for the legislature to deal exhaustively with every
case, the perceived "scientific" results that a body of experts might yield, and,
less frequently, an inability to reach political consensus. In the United States,
increased government regulation has come under scrutiny as being antidemocratic - either by taking decisions away from the legislature and the
political process or by becoming "captured" by the ruling administration or the
regulated industry. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (Little, Brown & Co. 1979)
(describing the shortcomings and dysfunctions of administrative law in the
United States). The anti-democratic arguments weaken in the Chinese context.
With a less democratic legislature, it is hard to see how independent rulemaking threatens democracy except perhaps by strengthening the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the underlying political system. Indeed, handing off these
decisions to a scientific group may be preferable - even to the government,
which seeks "scientific development" and decisions less marred by corruption
and political dysfunction. In addition, administrative rulemaking fits well with
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favor of reviewing two critical elements that all effective regulatory
mechanisms include: agency adherence to government priorities as
stated by the substantive law, particularly in the face of non-legal
pressures, and a record of effective compliance by the regulated.
1I.

BRIEF REVIEW

OF THE GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CHINA

Chinese administrative law is expansive, recently developed, and
relatively understudied.13 The breadth and significance
of
administrative law is particularly great in China, where a unitary
government grants neither effective supervision to the courts nor
meaningful separation from the legislature, and where agencies thereby
become largely unassailable in addition to possessing unique court-like
punishment powers. 4 Because China exercises much of its significant
power through administrative action, its field of administrative law is
extremely broad. Finally, because of effective government immunity
and an underlying political and social command and control
framework, the burden for enforcing regulations is placed even more
heavily on administrative agencies in China than in other countries.' 5
Possibly as a result of its shear breadth, there has not been a
comprehensive description of administrative law in China. 16
A
traditional Chinese rule of law notions that focus more on principles of rule by
law and seek to enhance the power of the unitary state and guide society with a
more scientific or enlightened rationality than the proletariat possess at this
point in their development.
13 This paper uses the terms "administrative law" and "regulatory law"
interchangeably. See also Xixin Wang, Administrative ProcedureReforms in
China's Rule of Law Context, 12 COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 251, 251-52 (1998)
(observing that "while the law reforms have focused mostly on the construction
of a substantive legal system, the legal procedure, which traditionally has long
been the weakest part of China's legal system, has not received enough
attention from either legal scholars or the Chinese leaders").
14China follows a unitary model that allocates power to agencies. PRC
courts do not have the authority to review an agency decision's compliance
with the PRC Constitution and therefore rarely intervene.
The PRC
Constitution grants the NPC the power to review the constitutionality of
regulations, but this power has not been used. Indeed, the lawmaking and rulemaking process are often indistinguishable. Chinese agencies can exercise
administrative detention, a significant punishment that operates outside the
judicial criminal system.
15 Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospectsfor
Regulatory Innovation in the People's Republic of China, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1050, 1062 (2006).
16Interview with Xixin Wang in Beijing (Nov. 2007).
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comprehensive description would include the principal administrative
organs, forms of action, rulemaking procedures, decision-making and
punishment powers and procedures, enforcement mechanisms, controls
over agency action, and remedies for violations of individual rights,
among other subjects.
This section does not aim to achieve a detailed and
comprehensive review of Chinese administrative law.
Rather, the
principal intent is to review the remarkable breadth of Chinese
administrative law and the rapidity of recent reforms to support the
proposition that the Chinese government has devoted significant energy
to creating a strong rule-making and enforcement process, particularly
with regard to labor and environmental concerns. It does not discuss
the administrative punishment or detention 7systems, nor does it deal
with any subject in more than cursory detail.'
China formally adheres to "democratic centralism,"1 8 so a
description of the country's regulatory regime with predictive
resonance might best begin by evaluating that regime in the context of
the current goals and doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
17

Substantial

treatment

has

been

given

to

China's

system

of

administrative punishment, which includes the substantive law and procedures
relating to punishment, such as administrative detention, education through
labor, and suspension of license. See Biddulph, supra note 10.
18Cooney, supra note 15, at 1084. Article 3 of the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China states that "the state organs of the People's
Republic of China apply the principle of democratic centralism." Article 3
explains: "All administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the state are
created by the people's congresses to which they are responsible and under
whose supervision they operate. The division of functions and powers between
the central and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full play
to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified
leadership of the central authorities." "Democratic centralism" seeks to resolve
natural tension between local and national government authorities and national
authorities. Article 3 recognizes the "initiative and enthusiasm" of local
authorities but strongly suggests that disputes are to be resolved in favor of
"central authorities." This lack of clarity (i.e., not firmly stating that the central
authorities trump local authorities) is itself an example of democratic
centralism: one government issuing consistent leadership and rather than
publicly airing disputes among government authorities. Indeed, Article 3
asserts the "unified leadership of the central authorities," which demonstrates
China's lack of explicit separations of power and power sharing provisions,
precisely because unified leadership is envisioned. This assumption of unified
leadership - whether premised on a desire to present the people with a unified
front or a sincere belief in a particular direction forward - helps explain why
China has not established a system of separation of competing powers.
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Now enshrined in the CCP's guiding ideology is President Hu Jintao's

"scientific development concept" of creating a "harmonious society."' 9
President Hu's "characteristics of a harmonious society" include,
among others, "democracy and rule of law" and "harmony between
man and nature." 20 These ideals are to be served in accordance with and
as a result of "scientific decision-making," which includes a substantial
dose of rule of law, rule-making, and rule-enforcing reforms. 2 1 In other
words, the hallmarks of administrative law -- technocratic decisionmaking and rule of law -- stand at the core of the CCP's contemporary
goals.
At the broadest legal level, the system of administrative law is
guided by the constitution, fundamentally reintroduced in 1982, that
authorizes the NPC and its Standing Committee to issue statutes and
This
the State Council to issue administrative regulations. 22
administrative power extends to ministries and commissions under the

19 "Scientific Development Concept and Harmonious Society," 17th
Nat'l People's Cong., http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm.
20

Id.

21 China To Set Up Five New "Super Ministries," CHINA DALY, Mar. 11,
2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/1 l/content_
6527183.htm (reporting that President Hu Jintao vowed to accelerate the
reform of the administrative system and build a service-oriented government at
the 17th National Congress and declared: "[w]e must lose no time in working
out a master plan for it." In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao described reform of
the administrative system as "an important link in deepening reform, an
important part of the reform of political institutions, and an essential step in
improving the socialist market economy."). See also "Scientific Development
Society,"
17th Nat'l People's
Cong.,
Concept
and Harmonious
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm (calling for "[i]n-depth
reform and opening up. We shall continue in the direction of reform to develop
the socialist market economy. In order to meet the requirements for economic
and social development, we shall promote economic, political, cultural and
social restructuring and innovation. We shall open wider to the outside world,
make the reform decisions more scientific and the reform measures more
coordinate so as to establish more dynamic, more efficient and more open
systems and mechanisms. Democracy and the rule of law. We should build
socialist democracy and implement the fundamental principle of administering
the country according to law. We shall build a socialist country under the rule
of law, enhance the legal awareness of the whole society and promote the
legalization and standardization of national economy, politics, culture and
social life so as to gradually constitute the social justice guaranteeing system
and to promote social justice.").
22 Constitution of the People's Republic of China. In practice, the State
Council and the Standing Committee effectively issue regulations.
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State

Council,
23

provincial

governments,

and

provincial

capital

governments.
The NPC has promulgated a series of general laws that establish
the procedures for administrative rulemaking and enforcement. These
include the Administrative Litigation Law (also translated as the
Administrative
Procedure Law) (1989),24 the Administrative
Reconsideration Law (1999),25 the State Compensation Law (1994),26
the Administrative Punishment Law (1996),27 the Administrative
8
Supervision Law (1997),2 the Administrative Licensing Law (2003),29
and the Administrative Penalties Law, 30 among others.
These
procedures for administrative rulemaking have at times been
experimental, either as stated in the formal text of the relevant
legislation (e.g., the Law on Legislation (2000) calls for public
participation) or in the execution of the law (e.g., the Labor Law (2007)
was formulated on the basis of unprecedented notice and comment
periods). a
23 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 89.
24
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
administration/administrative-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china1990.html.
25
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
administration/administrative-reconsideration-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china1999.html.
26
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
general/state-compensation-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china- 1994.html.
27
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
administration/administrative-punishment-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china1996.html.
28
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
administration/administrative-supervision-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china1997.html.
29
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/
administration/administrative-license-law-of-the-peoples-repubic-of-china2003.html.
30 http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/apl269/
31 Li fa fa [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) LAW INFO CHINA,
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=l&id=386&
keyword=legislation%20law (last visited Sep. 9, 2009) (P.R.C.); Law on
Employment Contracts (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong. June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008) translated at
http://www.chinalawblog.com/PRC%20Workers%2OLaw.pdf; see also Labor
Laws Bolstered in China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/01/business/chilabor.php.
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The next layer of the Chinese regulatory system consists of
substantive laws promulgated for nationwide application by the NPC.
These may overlap and tend not to be mutually exclusive or
collectively exhaustive. These laws may be enforced by a multiplicity
of national and even local agencies that in turn may issue their own
implementing regulations. The overlapping authorities and commandand-control enforcement mechanisms they are granted contribute to
dysfunction in the system.
A final element in the Chinese regulatory regime includes
influences from foreign government agencies, international certification
bodies, and multinational corporations. These institutions do not form
part of the Chinese legal framework, but their influence tends to affect
product safety and quality assurance. Their concerns may also expand
into environmental, labor, and other practices.
Export-oriented
production may be subject to inspection by agencies of foreign
governments including the United States Department of Agriculture
and the Food and Drug Administration. Many local and international
firms operating in China have been ISO-certified for best management,
environmental, or other practices. 32 Finally, many international firms
monitor the practices of their subsidiaries or suppliers in China to
maintain international standards or to respond to international concerns
of environmental and labor abuse.33
Recent developments in Chinese regulatory law include two
major experiments, one now complete and one just announced. With
great fanfare, China experimented with independent rule-making in
drafting the new Labor Contract Law (2007). 34 The Labor Law aims to
guarantee basic conditions to workers while also meeting business
needs.35 The Standing Committee36 attempted this balancing of
interests through an extraordinary American-style notice and comment
32 See, e.g., Mary Lynne Calkins, Make Friends First, Certify Later:
China and ISO 14000, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 609, 640 (1997). See also
http://www.sac.gov.cn/templet/english/ShowArticle.jsp?id=3313; See generally
http://www.sac.gov.cn/templet/default/.
33 See, e.g., Keiko Tanaka & Lawrence Busch, Standardization as a
Means for Globalizing a Commodity: The Case of Rapeseed in China. 68.1
RURAL Soc. 25 (2003).
34 http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3017/fights over chineselabor
reform; see generally Edward Cody, China Enacts Stronger Labor Law: New

Rules to Protect Abused Migrant Workers, Wash. Post For. Serv., Wash. Post;

Jun 30,35 2007, at DI.
id.

36 id.
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period that attracted input from hundreds of thousands of citizens and
organizations.37 However, the Standing Committee struggled with
evaluating this input, and the law ultimately did not achieve the buy-in
of important business interests and many of the rules remained
unclear. 38 In response to the Labor Law, household brand Huawei
apparently fired 80% of its workers, 39 and Olympus decided to move a
factory to Vietnam.40 Finally, the enormous number of violations,
resulting from the expansiveness and lack of clarity in the law,
combined with few resources to prosecute those violations has meant a
dramatic failing in the enforcement of the law and its original goals.41
The subsequent
economic challenges gave further pause to the effect of
42
the labor law.
In March 2008, the NPC announced the establishment of five
new "super ministries": the ministry of industry and information, the
ministry of human resources and social security, the ministry of
environmental protection, the ministry of housing and urban-rural
construction, and the ministry of transport. 43 Two areas in which rulemaking and enforcement mechanisms were frequently criticized energy policy and food and drug safety - were also given much clearer
authority structures.
With regard to energy, the national energy
commission was designed to be a "high-level inter-ministerial
coordinator" with a national bureau of energy to be set up as its
working office under the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC). With regard to food and drug safety, the
Ministry of Health was designed to oversee the nine agencies already
charged with food and drug safety-related duties and having
overlapping jurisdiction.44

37

id,

38 LaborLaws Bolsteredin China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2, 2008.

39 See also http://www.china.org.cn/english/news/230662.htm.
40 New Chinese Labor Law Causes Olympus to Flee to Vietnam,
ChinaCSR.com, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.chinacsr.com/2007/ll/13/1849new-chinese-labor-law-causes-olympus-to-flee-to-vietnam.
41Jude Blanchett, Key Issue For China's New Labor Law: Enforcement,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 2007, at 11, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0702/p 11 s02-woap.html.
42 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123215043508192065.html.
43 Jim Yardley, China Retools its Government in Efficiency Push, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/
12/world/asia/12china.html?scp=2&sq=china+safety&st-nyt; China To Set Up
Five New "SuperMinistries," supra note 21.
44 Yardley, supra note 43.
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ONGOING CHALLENGES

Commentators frequently observe that China has many rules but
most are seldom enforced.45 One representative report noted that
"[p]assing the law was only the first step: the biggest challenge that
China faced, and continues to face, is the effective enforcement of
environmental protection laws. ''4 In addition, Ira Belkin, the China
Rule of Law Program Officer at the Ford Foundation, concludes that
"[g]iven the general ineffectiveness of the Chinese litigation system...
and the vulnerability of the regulatory system to corruption,
incompetence, lack of enforcement resources and local protectionism,
you have a formula for the47kind of product safety problems we have
seen coming out of China."
To be sure, significant challenges plague Chinese rulemaking
and enforcement, frequently leaving the structures and words of
administrative law as lifeless forms. This article discusses several of
the contributing factors, including constitutional/political structure,
social structure/civil society, political will/capital, regulatory
structure/style, and resistance to exogenous influence. China admits
many of these shortcomings, emphasizing some special difficulties in
enforcement (the challenges of local agencies and corruption) and
rulemaking, if not in its fundamental system of government.48 Despite
recent reforms, the challenges persist because they reinforce each other
in a vicious and evermore entrenched dialectic. The central strategic
question facing those who seek a more effective regulatory regime is
45See, e.g., Clissold, Tom, Mr. China, (noting "I was dealing with a

society that had no rules; or more accurately, plenty of rules but they were
seldom enforced. China appeared to be run by masterful showmen: appearances
mattered more than substance, rules were there to be distorted and success
came through outfacing an opponent."

46 Meixian Li, China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will

Improve the Efficiency and Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in
China, 18 TEMP. INT'L& CoMP. L.J. 155, 156.

47E-mail Interview with Ira Belkin, Law and Rights Program Officer for
the China Region, Ford Foundation (Apr. 2008).
48 Admitting shortcomings is a tradition at CPC meetings, when the
government will vow to redouble its efforts on the work at hand. But these
admissions are still real.

See, e.g., China To Set Up Five New "Super

Ministries," supra note 21 (detailing State Councilor and Cabinet Secretary
Hua Jianmin's report on the necessity of reform, which observed that with
public administration and public services were still weak, the structure of
government institutions was irrational, and that "[plowers in some regards were
too concentrated and lack[ed] due oversight and checks.").
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then how to address these multi-polar problems and begin to turn a
vicious cycle into a virtuous one.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL IPOLITICAL STRUCTURE
China's unitary constitutional and political structure presents the
most fundamental challenge to effective rulemaking and enforcement.49
Although many of the challenges discussed in this section could
encumber other government systems, they become particularly
pernicious in China. The political ideology accepted by China,
confirmed in its Constitution and hardened by practice, rejects a
separation of powers.50 In government systems like that of the United
States, separation of powers is ultimately the force behind regulatory

enforcement. 5'
China's being a unitary state may, therefore, explain in part why,
despite the existence of an established judiciary and the Supreme
People's Procuratorate, 52 these bodies do not effectively hold the
government or other actors accountable for many violations of
regulatory law. This is not to say the Chinese system rejects a division
of labor, as evidenced by the flourishing plethora of enforcement
bodies and agencies, 53 including the judiciary and Procuratorate.
However, these actors are not independent or independently
accountable, and their guiding concern appears in many cases to be not
to ruffle feathers or slow economic growth.54 The unitary structure
49 See discussion on "democratic centralism" supra note 18.
50

Id. (discussing the "democratic centralism"

of Art. 3 of the

Constitution).
51Interview with David Vladeck (Feb. 11, 2008).
52 Section 7 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China,
at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
available
(establishing the People's Courts and the People's Procuratorates).
53 See, e.g., Michael Wines, Chinese Agencies Struggle Over Video
at
available
6,
2009,
Nov.
TIMES,
Game,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/world/asia/07china.html?_r= 1&scp=l&sq
=Chinese%20Agencies%2OStruggle%200ver/o20Video%20Game,&st-cse.
(discussing the dispute between two different government agencies asserting
competing authority to regulate video games).
54 Much has been made of the success of Singapore and other
authoritarian states' exemplary rule of law and regulatory enforcement. This
may result from an unquestioned commitment to compliance and getting things
right-even if it disrupts powerful interests-as well as the small size and
relative simplicity of Singapore. In any event, this paper does not aim to
rewrite a theme on the old and hackneyed debate "Can China be Singapore?"
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leads to confusion through overlapping mandates and substantial
inertia.
More specifically, the claim to unitary rule in a complex state
leads to contradictions that undermine the legitimacy of the rule of law
efforts. On the plane of constitutional structure, the unitary model leads
to a "local-central dichotomy," where local governments may claim to
adhere to national mandates but either ignore or flaunt them in
practice. 55 That a local-central dichotomy might arise in such a large,
diverse country with different needs and political pressures is
understandable, but the unitary state does not permit substantial
variation or federalism.
Unitary rule emasculates enforcement agencies by co-opting
what should be independent actors into state agents who may be
somewhat reminiscent of the royal functionaries in The Emperor's New
Clothes.56 In other words, centralism contradicts the separation of
powers that is inherent in administrative law (i.e., one body limiting the
actions of another with rules). For example, lawyers in China have
great difficulty escaping the logic of the unitary state:
The article draws the ironic conclusion that legal
practice in China reveals at least as much about the
enduring salience of socialist institutions as it does
about incipient capitalist and "rule of law"
institutions. Lawyers' dependence on state actors
both inside and outside the judicial system preserves
the value of political connections inside the very
institutions that some sociologists have argued are
responsible for'obviating the need for such guanxi.57

which asks whether the unitary authority, trading prowess, and technical flair of
the CCP can overcome the diverse and expansive Chinese state to deliver a
Singapore-like rule of law and standard of living.
55 Interview with Wang Xixin in Beijing (Nov. 2007). See also
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 3, supra note 18.
56 Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor's New Clothes, tells the story
of an emperor whose weavers promise a resplendent new outfit that cannot be
seen by anyone unfit for their positions. Consequently, no one admits, even the
emperor himself, that they see no clothes. In the end, only a child on a parade
route dares scream out that the emperor has no clothes.
57 Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional
Continuity in China's Transitionfrom Socialism, 113 No. 2 AM. J. Soc. 352,
352 (Sept. 2007).
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In essence, an effective regulatory regime cannot paper over
Although the
fundamental contradictions and weaknesses.
administrative law system has been used in cases where political
consensus is difficult to establish, it is very difficult to imagine a truly
effective administrative law system to the extent that there is political
dysfunction in balancing society's interest groups - whether regional,
class, or political.
B. SOCIAL STRUCTURE / CIVIL SOCIETY
Because governments have limited resources for enforcing a vast
array of regulations, an effective regulatory system usually requires a
substantial level of self-enforcement. This self-enforcement can be
facilitated in at least two ways: the buy-in of organized interests in the
rule-making process so that the interest holders understand and know
the rules, and the imposition of punishments sufficient to deter noncompliance. 58 Both interest-group inclusion and fear of punishment
require civil society. Interest groups must organize and effectively
represent various groups of society so that they can negotiate with
agencies to create realistic rules. Equally fundamental is a developed
"whistleblower society" that empowers citizens to make real
complaints and force compliance. Although a whistleblower society
may not require Western democracy, it does require sufficient human
rights protections and legal causes of action that would enable
aggrieved persons to raise concerns and be heard by the government in
an orderly fashion.
Unfortunately, however, democratic centralism expresses itself in
the foment of a "mass society" and the suppression of a "civil society."
In this model, the vanguard leadership of the Party guides the people at
In practice, this has meant the suppression of truly
large.59
representative and divergent interest groups and the squashing of
58 Naturally, there are many other factors, including the clarity of and
access to the regulation.
59"Vanguardism" is a Marxist-Leninist doctrine that asserts the need for
a "vanguard" of intellectuals (e.g., the Communist Party) to lead the masses
(who have lower awareness or "consciousness"). The doctrine is associated
most closely with Vladimir Lenin, whose 1902 "What Is to be Done?"
concluded that "through their own powers alone, the working-class can develop
only a trade-union consciousness." In the Chinese context, preamble to the
Chinese Constitution recites "the leadership of the Communist Party of China
and the guidance of Marxism- Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought." This is
consistent with why the CCP today remains selective, membership-only, and
can argue the people should defer to its dictates.
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whistle blowers and whistle blower mentality. 60 Instead of real
expression of interests, there are faux interest groups or individuals
who either fear raising concerns or find the whole process so
troublesome that they do not bother.61 Apparently, the weakness of
China's civil society is attributable to "the absence of strong,
autonomous, civil society organizations and the lack of independent
vehicles for diffusing and critiquing information," and "low education
and literacy levels," among other factors. 62 Cooney describes how
these factors have paralleled a deficiency in responding to potential
regulatory issues regarding working conditions:
Moreover, as has been shown, the lawful worker organizations
have, at least until very recently, done very little to give voice to
migrant workers-the socially and economically marginalized people
whom Chinese labor law is most deficient in assisting. Migrant
workers' low educational levels and social status often leave them
unwilling and unable to articulate their concerns; unless they receive
institutional support, they will not be able to contribute to local
regulatory processes.

63

The result is an enforcement system that at times prefers fear to
whistle-blowing, a system in which such self-enforcement might only
be a sure thing in the rare and extreme cases that reach national
attention in a chaotic way and that ultimately require political rather
than regulatory intervention. This failure is compounded by a "Wild
West" trend wherein actors may not care about the public sphere or
third parties because selfish interests are not checked and there is
"widespread intolerance of diverse viewpoints, inhibiting reasoned
64
deliberation."

60 For example, the National People's Congress exists as a democratic
organ and includes representation from many minority groups. However, the
CCP holds almost all seats in the NPC.

61 Cooney, supra note 15, at 1084 (asserting that "[t]he civil society

organizations most relevant to more participatory forms of workplace
regulation-organizations of working people-are either subordinate to the
party-State, top-driven and frequently aligned with management, or actively
suppressed").

62 Id. (citing RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOwARD
THE RULE OF LAW 428-31 (2002)).
63 Id.

64id.
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C. POLITICAL WILL / CAPITAL

A perceived void of political will or capital of the leadership to
make difficult decisions obstructs the regulatory regime from
continuous and aggressive enforcement. First, the expansive and
sclerotic regulatory regime is rigged with inertia that likely only
significant political investment can overcome. Randy Peerenboom
observes both "the likely hostility of the bureaucracy to alternative
approaches [and] the likely resistance of local government institutions
to requirements of information disclosure and external monitoring and
evaluation (vital to the effectiveness of those approaches). 65 This
inertia and regulatory capture is often cemented by corruption, and
reports suggest that the judiciary, the newly-formed Anti-Corruption
and Bribery Bureau, and the Central Disciplinary Committee do not
have the political will or independence to pursue senior-level
corruption without explicit superior permission.66
Second, the Chinese government does not want to risk slowing
development or creating a whistleblower society-at least not too
quickly-lest it develop effective opposition groups. As a result,
enforcement may take place only when there has been a possibility of
severe embarrassment, generating a practice of saving face and
appearances rather than generating a culture of self-enforcement,
particularly on smaller violations that would be unlikely to generate
extreme embarrassment.
Third, Chinese commitments to enforcement in the pastwhether commitments made purely voluntarily or in exchange for
international negotiations-have often not been carried through. For
example, China courted ISO 14000 certification for environmental
management and agreed to pursue many global standards (particularly
in banking but also in an array of industries) in exchange for
membership in the WTO.67 Yet years later, reports declare that "China

id.
66 Id.; Anti-Corruption in China: The Key Findings, Globallntegrity.org,
Jan. 31, 2008, http://commons.globalintegrity.org/2008/0 1/china-key-findingspart-2-of-3.html.
67 Li fa fa, supra note 31, at 156. It has been argued that Zhu Rongji
strongly pursued admission to the WTO in order to provide external forces of
modernization, fearing that the domestic economic and the domestic political
regime needed to be augmented if China's financial and other industrial
practices were to develop to meet global standards.
65
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should68strive to adopt the ISO 14000 not only in word, but also in
deed.

D. REGULATORY STRUCTURE / STYLE
Both clear rule-making and effective implementation in China's
regulatory system suffer from challenges posed by its organizational
structure and style.
First, organizational challenges include
overlapping and unclear authority. For example, "[n]ine government
authorities and agencies have major responsibilities for managing
various facets of the PRC's food safety system, while [another eight]
have secondary roles., 69 The recent responses discussed at the end of
Part II do not appear to have reduced the plethora of agencies that must
cooperate to develop and enforce rules on food and drug development
and production. 70 Second, with regard to deficiencies in the style of
enforcement and rule-making, Cooney notes "[a] failure to clarify key
norms, a bureaucratic 'command and control' approach to inspection
and dispute resolution, and a narrow and ineffective range of tools for
inducing compliance.", 71 A tradition of ambiguous, informal, and
inaccessible Chinese legislation, regulations, and court decisions
further compounds the ineffectiveness of this style of enforcement and
rule-making. The recent controversy over tainted heparin presents a
case in point. The State Food and Drug Administration, China's
national drug agency, initially contended that "ensuring the quality of
exported chemicals like heparin was the responsibility of importers and
importing countries." Then, in the face of international concern over
the safety of heparin, the Administration posted a declaration on its
website "that requires heparin producers to obtain the raw chemicals
used to make the drug from registered suppliers"
and to "improve their
72
management and tests on their products.,
E. RESISTANCE TO EXOGENOUS INFLUENCE
Despite the international clamor for Chinese compliance with
product safety, labor, and environmental standards, the Chinese system
68
69

Calkins, supra note 32, at 640.
http://www.adb.org/documents/produced-under-ta/37599/os-food-safety-

en.pdf.

70 See discussion supra at notes 43-44.
71Cooney, supra note 15, at 1051.

72 Elaine Kurtenbach, China Orders Tighter Controls on Heparin,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/

health/articles/2008/03/2 1/china orders tighter controls_on_heparin/.
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has been resistant to external interference.73 This is a result of many of
the structural challenges discussed above. No one party, domestic or
international, has the full power to resolve China's many social
challenges and, as in so many other areas, China moves at its own
rhythm. Insistence on sovereignty over its own affairs, a desire to
display international independence, and conflicting domestic concerns
buttress China's insulation and contribute to its wait-and-see
moderation.74 Current efforts by foreign governments to inspect or

73Of course, most countries resist external influence. For an interesting

comparison to the United States' experience in resisting international calls for
standardization, see Steven Mihm, A Nation of Outlaws: A Century Ago, That
Wasn't China - It Was Us, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/08/26/anationof
_outlaws/?page=4 (asserting that "[t]he rogue industries of the United States
eventually responded to stiff international economic pressure. Beginning in the
1880s, the European meat boycotts spurred Congress to pass a raft of federal
legislation aimed at imposing some inspection controls on the exports of meat.
In response, European countries opened their doors to American meat again.
And in 1891, Congress finally bowed to decades of angry lobbying and passed
an international copyright law that protected foreign authors.").
74 A good example is the history of the ISO 14000 relating to
environmental management. See Keith Hand, ISO 14000 Implementation in the
People's Republic of China, ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL LTD., 1997, at 3,

available at http://www.eiltd.net/publications/ISOChina.pdf ("[S]upportive
statements by Chinese officials, a flurry of activity in China related to ISO
14000, and enthusiasm in the PRC for ISO 9000 suggest that China has
significant interest in ISO 14000 and that the integration of these standards into
China's environmental regulatory regime is likely."). Yet, Calkins, supra note
32, reported some years later that "[i]mplementation will swim against a
current of underlying mismanagement, and certain aspects of ISO 14000 may
tempt China to revert to its patterns of deception. In his preface to The Bad
Earth, which documents China's environmental decline and which cites solely
Chinese sources, Vaclav Smil noted the naivet6 of foreign enthusiasts who had
admired China's apparent Communist 'miracle' and whose hopes were dashed
when truth about its failures came to light. An analogy may be drawn to the
international business community today, which marvels at China's apparent
economic miracle and drools over the prospect of tapping its gigantic consumer
market. While China's attempted participation in ISO 14000 will be better than
nothing, the international community should be wary of China's claims of
proper certification and effective environmental measures." See also Di
Chang-Xing, ISO 14001: The Severe Challenge of China. An Overview on the
Problems China Faced in the Implementation and Certificationof ISO 14001,
in GROWING PAINS: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
101, 101-119 (Walter Wehrmeyer & Yacob Mulugetta eds., Greenleaf Publ'g
1999).
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negotiate appear to fall short because of language barriers, lack of
resources, and lack of global reach.75
IV.

RESPONSES

Responding to the structural weaknesses of the Chinese
regulatory regime is extraordinarily complex because of both the
multiplicity and interlinking of challenges and the absolute policy of
the Chinese government to maintain its unitary system. Recognizing
the overwhelming nature of these challenges and the nearly continuous
criticisms of the Chinese state, some have complained that "criticism is
frequently unaccompanied by specific reform proposals that are
feasible in the Chinese context."7 6 Nonetheless, a series of suggestions
have been proposed to breathe life into the Chinese regulatory regime,
ranging from relatively discreet and practical to wholesale revisions of
the Chinese political system. In the interest of pragmatism, this paper
does not include those options expressly aimed at fundamentally
redrawing the Chinese political system.
A. DO NOTHING
The option of doing nothing is something of a misnomer
because, as noted earlier, the status quo involves significant
experimentation with regulatory reform. The approach is not based on
a lack of interest by the U.S. or China; rather, it premises an
understanding that China's regulatory system will continue to develop
for the better if left to its current momentum. Stephen Mihm, of the
University of Georgia, looks to the history of the United States in
arguing that "[a]t a certain point, some of the push for change can come
from within. As a capitalist system evolves, there can come a time
when some players in the economy prefer to be held to more stringent
standards, even ones that impose additional costs. ' 7 7 Mihm argues that
just as "[i]n the scandal-racked American food business [when] several
industry leaders converted to the cause of regulation in no small part
because there was money to be made," so will China's "own
entrepreneurs and industries... recognize that to get rich while bowing
71 See The F.D.A. in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/03/opinion/03sun 1.html?scp=31 &sq china+
safety&st=nyt; see also Gardiner Harris, For F.D.A., a Major Backlog
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8 2008, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
01/29/washington/29fda.html?scp=39&sqchina+safety&st-nyt.
76 Cooney, supra note 15, at 1052.
77
Mihm, supra note 73.
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to international standards may be equally glorious -- and even more
profitable. ' T
However appealing, the "do nothing" approach still assumes that
better regulation will be required at some point but leaves us to trust
that it will come about naturally. The approach does not articulate how
to develop better regulation most effectively or efficiently or respond to
the very real imperative for effective regulation today.
Finally,
significant differences may exist in the ability of these concerns to rise
to the surface in China, given its unique brand of centralism and
suppression of voices.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL
Absent fundamental changes in China's constitutional/political
system, there are relatively few direct responses to the basic
central/local
and
centralism/judicial
review
contradictions.
Nonetheless, increasing claims of action and permitting greater
regulatory diversity across the country would enable more effective
regulatory mechanisms without directly undermining unitary rule. For
example, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
concluded that despite "the sizeable population in the vast expanse of
Chinese territory," China had the capacity to "effectively implement
the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)]."79 In essence, the ICESCR urges China "to ensure that
legal and judicial training takes full account of the justiciability of the
rights contained in the Covenant and promotes the use of the Covenant
as a source of law in domestic courts." 80 Although the ICESCR
recognizes "[tihe translation of international law to a domestic level is
not an easy task," its
broad calls to fundamental reform appear
8
idealistic and abstract. 1

78

Id.

79 Leila Choukroune, Justiciability of Economic. Social, and Cultural

Rights: The UN Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights' Review
of China's First Periodic Report on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, 19 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 30,
41 (2005) (quoting Considerationof Reports Submitted by State PartiesUnder
Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observationsof the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: People's Republic of China
(Including Hong Kong and Macao), U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005)).
' 0 Id. at 42.
81 Id. at 49.
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C. SOCIAL STRUCTURE/CIVIL SOCIETY

Efforts to build interest groups and encourage a "whistleblower"
society are critical. These efforts may be pursued through interest
group reform and support and expanded access to the justice system:
[A] regulatory system, by itself, cannot adequately
police a free market. You need a more effective free
market legal system as well. Victims and their
lawyers need to be empowered to take on companies
that produce unsafe products and those companies
need to have so much at stake that they are motivated
to do everything they can to institute rigorous
product safety regimes.8 2
Similarly, in the context of labor regulation, Cooney proposes
improvements to the legal system and to the ability to make legal
claims.8 3 One simple means of increasing access to courts is to abolish
the requirement that arbitration precede litigation and to permit
agencies to grant interim relief and entertain disputes between
independent contractors under certain circumstances.
Several
international jurisdictions take this approach pursuant to "unfair
contract" legislation. 84 Other ways to improve interest in labor
regulation include ensuring that the labor bureau employ better-trained
personnel, adhere to specific procedures for different kinds of disputes
(rights/interest and collective/individual), provide support to workers
left without income during disputes, and include labor dispute
85
resolution for sub-contractors who may not technically be employees.
In addition, the establishment of representative trade unions in
China might permit an increased inclusion of interest groups in rulemaking and might permit groups to hold employers and governments
accountable. Even if China does not observe International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions on the rights to organize and bargain
collectively, Cooney articulates several ways in which trade
unions
86
might "at least become more effective compliance agencies.,
Finally, the Chinese media has increasingly focused on rulebreakers in its "Law Weekly" program and has made other attempts to
82

E-mail Interview with Ira Belkin, Law and Rights Program Officer for

the China Region, Ford Foundation (Apr. 2008).
83 Cooney, supra note 15, at 1086.
84Id.
at 1088.
85

1d. at 1089.

86

id
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build favor by responding to the outrage of common citizens.
Increased legal and social programming that includes critiques and
means of responding to regulatory issues will foster general social
awareness and courage in building a democratic rule of law.
D. POLITICAL WILL/CAPITAL
China has devoted enormous energy to its regulatory regime and
has called administrative reform "imperative" 87 and "high on the
agenda."88 However, the best means of ensuring China's seriousness is
to increase the consequences of not following through or by decreasing
the roadblocks to following through, which turn out to be the flip side
of the same issue. That is to say, any options that alter the calculus of
the relationship between economic growth, prosecutorial resources,
legitimacy, inertia, and international relationships vis-A-vis effective
regulatory enforcement may increase the political will and capital of
the government. It is important to remember, too, that political will
may vary: what is relatively easy to obtain for export-oriented products
may be far more elusive for environmental or labor issues. Finally, it
may be that, once a vicious cycle transforms into a virtuous one, greater
supervision, momentum, and reduced 8corruption
will work together to
9
promote broad regulatory enforcement.
E. REGULATORY STRUCTURE / STYLE
A wide array of measures, both simple and profound, has been
proposed to improve the structure and style of regulatory rulemaking
and enforcement. These measures include clarification of norms, more
effective and appropriate punishments, innovative styles to foment selfimplementation, and streamlined bureaucracies.
More effective sanctions would include a wider range of
penalties and penalties designed with the goal of encouraging
compliance. Currently, many bureaucracies have no intermediate
sanction between "a mere fine (in case of the labor department)" and
87 Administrative Reform

'Imperative,' XINHUA

NEWs AGENCY, Mar. 5,

2008, http://www.china.org.cn/govemment/NPCCPPCC-sessions2008/200803/05/content 11593009.htm.
88 Political Reform High on Agenda, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/28/content6490601.htm.
89 Effective Supervision Will Cure China's Corruption Woes, CHINA

DAILY, Feb. 9, 2008,
content_806239.htm.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/09/
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"imprisonment (in case of the police)." 90 An intermediate punishment
might be suspension of a business license until an offender complies.
With regard to encouraging compliance, punishments must be designed
as part of a comprehensive and effective enforcement strategy. For
example, Ayres and Braithwaite propose an "enforcement period" of
persuasion, warning, and sanctions. 91
More effective rules and enforcement policies could also be
designed through reference to human and business psychology and
through a recognition of the obsolescence of the command-and-control
model, which emphasizes State-based standard setting and imposition
of sanctions.92 Indeed, "responsive," "reflexive," or "decentered"
rulemaking models have proved preferable to the "command and
control" model.93 Although Cooney asserts that it is "doubtful how far
[alternative regulatory approaches] can be applied in the Chinese
context, 94 he later acknowledges "evidence of emerging regulatory
innovation and sophistication that may lead to a much more effective
legal response." 95 Cooney further observes "some scope for regulatory
experimentation and decentralization" in that China has "frequently
taken an incremental, localized, and experimental approach to
economic and social reform [and] . . . [t]here have been rolling
improvements in legal norms and enforcement strategies. 9 6 These
mainly consist of a series of commands coupled with punishments,
although97 they try to prompt firms to build internal compliance
systems.
F. RESISTANCE TO EXOGENOUS INFLUENCE
Globalization is the strongest factor strengthening external
influence on the Chinese regulatory regime. Arguably the strongest of
these are multinational corporations, which import global standards and
even corporate responsibility initiatives to their own operations and
sometimes to those of their subcontractors.98 Yet even corporations'
90 Cooney, supra note 15, at 1088 (paralleling the lack of range in
criminal law, where extremely light or heavy punishments are the only
availabilities for crimes (e.g., death penalty or one year inprison)).
91 Id.

92

See Id. at 1052.

93
94 See

id. at 1082-85 nn.195-206.
1d. at 1084.
95
Id. at 1051, 1060.
96
Id. at 1085.
97 Id.

98

Id. at 1085 n.209, 1091.
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successes have been mixed, with successes in the Ethical Trade
otherwise "perfunctory and disingenuous"
Initiative or SA8000, but 99
performance or monitoring.
A second external means of improving regulatory compliance is
through international standards organizations. An extensive array of
literature debates the effectiveness of ISO and other certifications,
frequently as a substitute for effective government regulation in
developing economies.l°°
V. U.S. AND CHINESE INTERESTS IMPLICATED BY CHINA'S
REGULATORY REGIME

Cooperation in building a more effective regulatory regime in
China requires common interests. Given that many of the international
calls for greater regulation derive at least in part from protectionist
xenophobia, it is not immediately clear that China would or should
welcome U.S. assistance. 0 1 Similarly, given that a stronger regulatory
regime may strengthen a non-democratic government and its
punishment systems, some Americans may take pause in cooperating
at all. This section analyzes the interests that the United States and
China have at stake and the extent to which these interests can yield
common ground.
The analysis begins with a listing of the interests at stake in the
dialogue, as advised in Fisher and Ury's seminal book Getting to
Yes. 102 These interests are not positions (e.g., the United States
requires that all products be processed in complete accordance with
ISO 14000), but fundamental concerns (e.g., protect citizens from
unsafe foods) that drive any number of possible positions. The benefit
99

d. at 1091.
1oo See generallyTanaka & Busch, supra note 33; Calkins, supra note 32,
at 613; Maki Hatanaka, Third-Party Certificationas a Governance Tool: From
the Perspective of the Actors in the Global South, INT'L SYMP. ON
CERTIFICATION & TRACEABILITY FOR FOOD SAFETY & QUALITY, Oct. 18, 2007.
101Belkin, supra note 82; see also France Tries To Limit Olympics

Fallout, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/22/world/europe/22france.html?hp (quoting a Le Figaro editorial:
"Under the noble defense of our 'universal values,' sometimes a racist stench
hides that is quite contrary to the principles we pretend to incarnate ...

[The

pro-Tibetan mobilization] is that much stronger because it is fed by a fear of
'Made in China"').
102 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 50 (Penguin Books

1991).
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of listing interests is to find common ground and to see beyond specific
options to creative means of generating value. As Fisher and Ury
observe, "[i]n many negotiations . . . a close examination of the
underlying interests will reveal the existence of many more
interests
10 3
that are shared or compatible than ones that are opposed."'
Establishing the list of interests is challenging because it is
difficult to disaggregate many concerns into mutually exclusive yet
comprehensively exhaustive interests. The discussions over Chinese
regulatory measures are particularly difficult because of the political
valence of the description of any particular interest (e.g., "maintaining a
U.S. position of influence" or "containing China" may sound
equivalent to one party but sound completely different to another). It is
also important to remember that issues of psyche (e.g., China's feeling
of having been "oppressed" or feelings of the U.S. about the justice of
spreading liberty
and democracy) are as real and valid for nations as for
14
individuals.
One additional challenge is the pluralist nature of countries:
nation-states are complex and their interests are not subject to
definition by any one party, whether a representative of the U.S. or
China. Nonetheless, for purposes of this paper, it will assume the
interests that might be expressed by the current administration.
The following table lists the essential interests the United States
believes are at stake for each party. The table is listed first for
orientation, with discussion of the interests - how arrived at and their
complementarities - following. Chinese interests are set forth first out
of respect.

03

' Id.at 42.

104See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 102, at 49.
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Important Interests at Stake in China's
Developing Effective
10 5
Regulatory Regime
P.R. China Government
Convergent

United States
Government

* Protect Chinese
consumers, workers,
environment

*

a Protect/attract foreign
investment in China

0 Protect foreign
investment in China

* Maintain working
relationship

* Maintain working
relationship

Unclear

0

0

Divergent

0 Consolidate CCP power
& legitimacy

o Promote
democratic/civil society

* Protect Chinese
industry/exports

0

* Sovereignty/rising
influence

position of Influence

Burnish image

Protect U.S.
consumers, workers,
environment

*

Burnish image

Protect U.S. industry
Maintain U.S.

Making a side-by-side list forces the consideration of which
interests converge and diverge. The first insight from the table is that
significant interests coincide. Maintaining a working relationship is in
each side's interests for stability and the ability to work together to
solve problems, including the many other issues that might arise in the
relationship. Protecting foreign investments is also an interest shared
by both sides. Finally, each side has an interest in protecting its own
consumers, workers, and environment. While this final concern may
not align perfectly, as there may be tradeoffs between these subgroups
and across countries, it does seem to present more likelihood of
common ground than opposition.

105 The complexity of the issues and parties involved make the creation of
an objectively exhaustive list difficult. Nonetheless, this table aims to
summarize concisely the driving interests at stake for each party.
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China similarly has criticized the U.S. for interfering in the
sovereignty of other nations.' 0 6 This criticism may be based on other
interests, spreading democracy or maintaining core interests, discussed
below. Yet it may be possible to envision a moment when both sides
burnish their image by cooperating to achieve results, or, if politically
attractive, by promoting that they are working together.
The potentially divergent interests are significantly more
complex, both because of their divergence and their more
psychological and indeterminate nature. The first of these interests for
the Chinese is to consolidate power and establish legitimacy. This
interest is extraordinarily broad and could conceivably be satisfied, or
undermined, by a range of policy options, creating both great
possibility for a workable solution and for peril. The Chinese
government appears to understand the construction of an effective
regulatory regime to be part of establishing legitimacy and
consolidating power; of course, such a regime must not establish or
reflect negatively on the
strengthen opposition groups or somehow
07
performance of the Chinese government.'
What is extremely challenging is that the goal of effective
regulation shared by the United States may also support the
consolidation of Chinese power and contravene U.S. interests in
promoting democracy and maintaining influence. This dynamic
presents challenges to the United States interests: Does cooperation on
effective governance entrench and legitimize the Chinese Communist
Party and its political system? And if so-Does this not conflict with the
strongly held interest of the U.S. in promoting democracy around the
world?
Naturally, a second strong, potentially divergent and overlapping
interest is China's interest in firmly guarding its sovereignty and
expanding its sphere of influence. 10 8 China has perceived itself as the
victim of foreign intervention in encounters ranging from the Opium
Wars to the Japanese occupation to modem interventions in Taiwan
106 Edward Cody, China, Others Criticize U.S. Report on Rights, WASH.

POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A3840-2005Mar3.hftml.
107 See discussion supra Section II describing how an effective regulatory
regime fits into the current goals of the CCP.
108 Shao Da, Peaceful Rise of China a Hot Topic, China.org, Apr. 22,
2005, http://china.org.cn/english/2005/Apr/126696.htm (China asserts its right
to rise and formally calls its doctrine of expanding influence "the peaceful
rise").
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and Tibet and even to its hosting the Olympics. Thus, China's
declarations that "[y]ou have no right to interfere in our interior affairs"
are common. ° 9 The Chinese government and people are extremely
sensitive to questions of sovereignty and are "infuriated by ... attacks
on the country's image."' 0 One student explains: "'China used to be
known as the sick man of Asia.... We were separated like sand....
After 5,000 years, we're not so soft anymore.""' 1
Sovereignty
concerns may be even more sensitive to Chinese citizens than to the
government; international backlash against China's Olympic torch
ceremonies in 2008 provoked on the Chinese people's part "a popular
backlash against Western support for Tibet that has unnerved foreign
investors and Western diplomats and, increasingly, the ruling
Communist Party."'1 12 This sensitivity both to foreign interference and
China's quick rise as a world power could potentially conflict with any
involvement of the U.S. in China's regulatory mechanisms, let alone
those involvements that would come as a result of U.S. interests in
maintaining presence and expanding democracy.
Finally, protectionism poses divergent interests with regard to the
Chinese regulatory system insofar as stricter regulatory enforcement
would drive up costs and make U.S. products more competitive. This
protectionist sentiment is probably an important driver of the
prominence that the Chinese regulatory debate has assumed in the
United States:
[w]ith the advent of the WTO, trade protectionism
has moved from the arena of tariffs to non-tariff
barriers, especially standards. Under the guise of
setting standards, a country can favor its domestic
products over imports and thus protect its domestic
producers from competition. In the context of trade
relation discussions, most of the discussion
is about
13
competing interests and not loftier goals.'
Despite these divergent interests, however, it is likely that
cooperation is more advantageous to both sides than the alternative. In
the absence of a negotiated agreement, China might continue its media
109 Andrew Jacobs & Jimmy Wang, Chinese Urge Anti-West Boycott
Over Tibet Stance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/world/asia/20china.html?hp.
10 ld
112 id.

113 Belkin, supra note 82.
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bashing of foreign interference and might claim to have stood up to the
United States. The Sino-U.S. trading relationship would also not be
immediately or dramatically imperiled given existing trade
relationships and WTO and other legal protocols. 14 Finally, the effect
of not working together on consolidation of power is at best unclear:
On the one hand, construction of an effective regulatory regime might
involve the establishment of more causes of action, a more
sophisticated organized civil society, and "whistleblowers" who might
challenge the government; on the other hand, a more effective
regulatory state would mean more power, less corruption, and greater
compliance with the rules and laws established by the Chinese
government.
More starkly for China, walking away from cooperation with the
U.S. would mean turning down assistance, including expertise, possibly
monetary support, and international commitments, and continuing to
struggle with developing an effective regulatory regime by itself.
China would also lose the ability to pre-commit to an international
partner, which might provide an important stimulus to making
otherwise difficult reforms. 15 Most importantly, China would likely
not make as much or as expeditious progress with respect to its
significant interests in establishing an international presence,
burnishing its image internationally, or, at least for now, protecting its
consumers, workers, and environment. Finally, walking away would
risk signaling that China is not serious about establishing rule of law,
which could undermine its legitimacy with its own citizens.
For the United States, walking away from a negotiated agreement
would permit more bashing of China and possibly-though unlikely
because of WTO and other restrictions-result in increased trade
barriers. That is to say that a breakdown in talks would not
significantly benefit U.S. industry or protectionism. However, a
breakdown in talks would also mean loss of influence with the Chinese
government and a decreased likelihood of future cooperation because
of the increased loss of face resulting from acute changes of
114 See, e.g., China Trade Surplus Up Nearly 50%, Despite Safety Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
01/1 /business/worldbusiness/1 trade.html.
115 Former Premier Zhu Rongji was famously supportive of joining the
WTO precisely because it would require the government to make economic
reforms that the country's government alone may not have had the political will
or capital to achieve without international oversight and involvement. Dwight
Perkins, Director of the Harvard University Asia Center, Lecture, Harvard
University, 2004.
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course. Most importantly, walking away would mean losing the ability
to monitor imports with any cost-effectiveness or cooperation, as well
as the ability to influence environmental and labor regulations in China

at any level.
Finally, both China and the United States require an effective
relationship for resolution of many other issues, ranging from defense
to international crises to other citizen services that could be imperiled
by unpredictable or divisive sensitivities resulting from the current
trade disputes. In other words, neither side can afford to imperil the
currently constructive bilateral relationship.
Now we have seen that convergent interests include options to
protect U.S. and Chinese consumers, workers, foreign investment, and
projects that build a constructive relationship. Divergent interests,
however, may also find convergence through prioritization and
framing. With regard to prioritization, the Unites States' highest
priority may be protecting U.S. industry, then U.S. influence, and
finally spreading democracy, whereas the China's highest priority
might be consolidating power, protecting Chinese industry, and rising.
Depending on the ordering, both sides could maintain their top interest
although divergent with an interest of the other side. One challenge the
U.S. must resolve is whether it is willing to help China in order to help
itself. The answer is probably "yes," given the importance of success
on a multiplicity of issues and the unpredictability of success in taking
a hard stance on one issue-say democratic reforms-particularly when
such a stark failure would severely cripple any other elements of the
relationship.
Refraining interests or studiously avoiding digging into deeply
felt frames might also reduce the conflict between China and the United
States' divergent interests. For example, although some options for
regulatory reform involve giving causes of action to aggrieved workers
or developing stronger interest groups, the United States might make
these proposals based on the shared interest of rule of law,
effectiveness, and protecting Chinese and U.S. consumers alike.
VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT
There are three layers in which the United States Government
might effectively work with China to establish a more effective
regulatory regime. As an initial matter, assuming adequate resources
exist, the U.S. can effectively monitor Chinese exports to the United
States (as it already largely does). Secondly, and more difficult yet
feasible with adequate resources and commitment from both sides,
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would be increased cooperation in developing standards and
mechanisms of administrative law. The third layer---addressing
cultural/political/rule of law issues-would be the most difficult to
perform successfully. All of these options must carefully avoid adding
costs, violating WTO and other trade protocols, and undermining
Chinese interests. Nevertheless, moving forward on the basis of shared
interests first and a desire to generate a constructive relationship,
significant cooperation may be feasible.
A. FIRST LAYER: UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS INCLUDING
MONITORING OF EXPORTS
With additional resources, the U.S. can increasingly monitor
Chinese exports to the United States (as it already largely does). Many
agree that the United States must send more personnel to China to
inspect factories and test goods before they are shipped. 16 Currently,
the FDA has no permanent staff of overseas inspectors,' 1 7 and any
overseas duty is on a voluntary basis. Even when inspectors travel
overseas, there are no translators on staff. Inspectors depend on
translators from the local producer, and FDA staff members have
complained that the translators may answer questions rather than the
staff to which the questions are directed. In addition, overseas visits
are not unannounced as government permissions, visas, and scheduling
are required. Although the FDA currently spends $11 million on
overseas inspections, it estimates it would require $70 million to visit
each facility every two years as it does domestically.' 18 This would not
only apply to the FDA but to a range of agencies including the
Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Department of Agriculture,
9
and others."
In addition, the United States could adjust its own legal regime to
force the private sector to take greater scrutiny in the sources and
conditions of production of imported food, drugs, and other products
with safety concerns: "If a U.S. company imports products from China,
it should assume responsibility of the product's safety. This will force
the market to respond. ABC company will either have to undertake

116
"1

118

China, Unregulated,supra note 1.
id.

Marcia Cross, supra note 4; China, Unregulated,supra note 1.
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its operations

Unilateral monitoring could apply to the scope of regulated
activity: homeland security, environmental protection, food safety, and
work conditions, among so many others. The danger of unilateral
monitoring is that it might not improve the PRC capabilities, might not
promote cooperation, and could lead to suspicion and misunderstanding
over the intent of this monitoring.
B. SECOND LAYER: SHARE EXPERTISE

More difficult yet feasible with adequate resources and
commitment from both sides would be increased cooperation in
developing standards and mechanisms of administrative law. The
United States would actively engage in sharing expertise as it has in
other nations, 121 making possible in other critical areas more
cooperation pacts like the China-U.S. Food Safety Pact. This middlelevel approach would maintain a good working relationship and keep
progress moving in the right direction. However, it might not achieve a
great deal in practical results.
C. THIRD LAYER: STRUCTURAL SUPPORT

The United States could offer the Chinese government an honest
appraisal of what is lacking in the Chinese legal system and an offer of
long term technical assistance to fix any issues1 22 Belkin notes that
success would also require a substantial commitment on China's part:

120 Belkin, supra note 82, Marcia Cross, supra note 4
121Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Plans to Post Inspectors Overseas, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
01/25/business/25fda.html (noting that "[t]he agency has long helped to train
foreign food and drug inspectors and even advise in the writing of legislation to
empower foreign versions of the F.D.A."); Jake Hooker & Walt Bogdanich,
Agreement with China to Regulate Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l2/l2/business/worldbusiness/
12safety.html?scp=98&sq=china+safety&st=nyt; U.S.-China Food Safety Pact,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
1
fullpage.html?res--9BOCE6DA1030F931 A2575 ClA9619C8B63&scp=100&s
q=china+safety&st=nyt (noting that China and the United States signed an
agreement calling for a greater American role in certifying and inspecting
Chinese food products).
122 Belkin, supra note 82.
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[Success] would require the negotiation of a
commitment on the part of the Chinese government
to make some fundamental reforms that would
ultimately be good for China and for the rest of the
world community: independent judges, effective
enforcement of judgments, empowerment of lawyers,
access to the legal system by anyone who has any
legal claim, greater
transparency in the courts'
23
handling of cases. 1
Carrots could include funding, expertise, and other valuables
while sticks could include harsher inspections or trade rules to the
extent permitted by the WTO and other trade protocols. Such
commitment would be extremely difficult to negotiate and secure but
would set a new standard for cooperation on common interests in SinoU.S. relations.
VII. CONCLUSION

The regulatory regime can be a tool of extraordinary power. It is
a means by which governments manage complex societies. The
successful regulatory regime protects the people against all sorts of
public threats, whether to the individual's security, product safety,
work conditions, human rights, or the environment.
Section II
specified two principal measures of an effective regulatory regime:
agency adherence to government priorities as stated by the substantive
law and a record of effective compliance by the regulated. The article's
analysis of the effective regulatory regime expressly excludes the moral
or normative value of the government priorities. Yet a "successful" or
"good" regulatory regime is not exactly the same as an effective one.
A regulatory regime so effective in realizing political goals may
nonetheless fail when the fundamental rights of the people have been
violated. The good regulatory regime is not only a tool of state power
but also a limit.
Now this line is difficult and dangerous to draw. If the regulatory
regime's entire authority derives from political power, how can it
disobey that power? If the regulatory regime is to be effective, how
can it get caught up in determining when it can proceed?
The regulatory regime has discretion, first by virtue of limited
resources and extensive government mandate. Second, although an
apparatus of political power, regulatory agencies are called to act

88

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF

[Vol. 6:53

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

within the bounds of justice. Where a strong constitution applies, the
regulatory regime must stop when it determines that its task crosses
into the unconstitutional. Where the constitution is not firmly in place,
regulatory agencies have an added responsibility to commit to
aspirational constitutional protections even in absence of external
controls. This obligation derives from agencies' essential identity as
actors of rule of law more than politics. Rule of law is not merely
acting according to the letter of the law but accomplishing the spirit of
justice as well. As a reference to U.S. constitutional law, "rule of law"
can be seen as having a substantive and procedural due process ethos.
To violate this essential duty to justice - no matter how effectively that
breach is carried out - would be to contradict the essence of the rule of
law. Despite the enormous growth of China's regulatory regime, China
has not yet established a categorically effective or good regulatory
regime. On the first measure of effectiveness, agencies diverge from
substantive law and government priorities, principally as a consequence
of unclear mandates, regulatory capture, and weak judicial
accountability. On the second measure of effectiveness, the regulated
rarely self-regulate. On the question of a "good" regulatory system, the
failure of a Chinese regulatory regime stems from an ineffective system
rather than from concerted administrative commitment to human rights
in the face of political pressure from above. The steps that will lead to
an effective regulatory regime are those that will enable a good regime
as well: judicial accountability, commitment to the spirit of rule of law,
and courage.
The PRC and United States governments share mutual interests
in strengthening the Chinese regulatory regime. The security of each
partner's citizens is the paramount factor. Protection of trade and the
diplomatic imperative for areas of common effort supplement this
shared interest. The U.S. has three principal options for assisting China
establish a more effective regulatory regime: expanded unilateral
monitoring, shared expertise and efforts on specific projects, and efforts
aimed at deep structural change in Chinese rule of law. As is often the
case in Chinese philosophy, the ripest route may be the middle one.
Shared expertise, personnel, training, and standardized laws and law
enforcement - helps China build its own capabilities without the
paternalism or suspicion the other roads could imply. Indeed, shared
expertise permits both sides to achieve their fundamental security goals
to their citizens without abandoning their own political commitments
and sensitivities. It serves both sides equally well and enables each
nation to continue - in all sincerity - its own vision for a just system of
rule of law.

